In this paper we consider the problem of maximizing a separable concave function over a polymatroid. More specifically, we study the submodularity of its optimal objective value in the parameters of the objective function. This question is interesting in its own right and is encountered in many applications. But our research has been mainly motivated by a cooperative game associated with the well-known joint replenishment model. By applying our general results on polymatroid optimization, we prove that this cooperative game is submodular, if the joint setup cost is a normalized and non-decreasing submodular function. Furthermore, the same result holds true for a more general one-warehouse multiple retailer game, which affirmatively answers an open question posed by Anily and Haviv [1] and Zhang [23] .
Introduction
In recent years, many companies have come to realize that their performance can be improved significantly by exploring innovative collaborative strategies in supply chain management. Companies can collaborate in many different ways. For example, shippers that make small, frequent shipments that do not use the full capacity of their trucks can collaborate and consolidate their orders into hopefully cheaper, faster truckloads. It has been reported that such collaboration among shippers leads to significant reduction in transportation cost as well as inventory cost. It is also known that inventory pooling is an effective way to reduce safety stock and increase customer service [4, 12] .
Thus, some companies collaborate by sharing their inventories. The cooperation usually takes the form of lateral transshipment from a location with a surplus of on-hand inventory to a location that faces a stockout.
One issue in such collaboration is to keep different parties motivated to collaborate. The willingness to collaborate often depends on the existence of mechanisms that allocate the cost or gain (from the collaboration) in such a way that is considered advantageous by all the participants.
Even though collaboration often leads to overall cost reduction, it is not always the case that such mechanisms exist. Indeed, getting all parties to agree on how to share costs and benefits was identified as one of the major barriers to collaborative commerce in practice (see [4, 12] ).
It is natural to apply cooperative game theory to analyze cost allocation issues. Indeed, supply chain collaborations have motivated more and more studies on cooperative games in the last few years; see Nagarajan and Sosic [13] for an excellent review in this area. Our paper is motivated by a cooperative game that is associated with the well-known joint replenishment model. In this model, there are multiple retailers which sell a single product. Constant customer demand occurs at each retailer over an infinite time horizon. The retailers replenish their inventories by ordering from an external supplier. There are two types of costs: a holding cost charged against each unit of inventory per unit time at each retailer, and a setup cost charged against each order that is a submodular function of the set of retailers that places the order together. We shall define submodularity in Section 2. Roughly speaking, submodularity captures the notion of decreasing marginal cost. For examples of submodular setup cost functions, we refer interested readers to Federgruen and Zheng [6] . The lead times are assumed to be zero, i.e., orders are delivered instantaneously. The goal of the model is to find an inventory replenishment policy for the system that minimizes the long-run average cost over an infinite time horizon. The optimal policy for this joint replenishment problem is unknown. However, it is well-known that a class of easy-to-implement policies, called power-of-two policies, are 98% effective; see Roundy [18] and Federgruen and Zheng [6] .
We assume that the retailers follow an optimal power-of-two policy to replenish their inventories. We are interested in the question of how the system-wide cost should be allocated among the retailers. A proper cost allocation scheme is important particularly when the retailers belong to different firms or are decentralized divisions of an organization. For this purpose, we formulate a cooperative game (in coalitional form) denoted by (N, V ) where the grand coalition N is the set of all retailers, and for any subset S ⊆ N , the characteristic cost function V (S) is the system-wide cost under optimal power-of-two policy when the system consists only of retailers in S. We call this cooperative game the joint replenishment game.
The theoretical question that we would like to address regarding the joint replenishment game is whether the characteristic cost function V (·) is submodular or not. If the answer is yes, then the joint replenishment game is submodular (or concave). This question is of particular importance since a submodular game has many nice properties. We mention a few of them below. First, if V (·) is submodular, then the grand coalition is stable. That is, there exists a cost allocation under which no group of retailers would be better off by deviating from the grand coalition and acting alone. Such an allocation is often called a core allocation. Second, if V (·) is submodular, then there exist efficient (polynomial time) algorithms to find a core allocation and check whether a given allocation is a core allocation or not. This is important because for a non-submodular game, it is possible that finding a core allocation can be done in polynomial time, but the problem of deciding whether a given allocation is a core allocation or not may be NP-hard. Third, for a submodular game, its nucleolus can be computed in polynomial time, and it has a large core, and its stable set coincides with the core. See Peleg and Sudholter [15] for the definition of the aforementioned important concepts in cooperative game theory.
In a recent paper, Anily and Haviv [1] show that the joint replenishment game is submodular when the joint setup cost function, denoted by K(·), has the so-called first order interaction structure, i.e., there exist K 0 and
However, the submodularity of the joint replenishment game with general submodular setup cost function K(·) has been posted as an open question in [1] and a more recent paper on this subject [23] . The joint replenishment game is known to have a population monotonic allocation scheme [24] , which typically is an indication that a game may be submodular. The population monotonicity implies that no retailer would be worse off when a new retailer joins the coalition. As we shall see in Section 3, the function V (S) can be expressed as
where k ∈ R |S| + is the decision variable and for each i ∈ N , f i (k i ) is a concave function of k i . Also, given our assumptions on the joint replenishment model, the feasible set of (1) turns out to be a polymatroid. Our goal is to show that the function V (·) defined in (1) is submodular.
This motivates us to consider the class of optimization problems of maximizing a separable concave function (or minimizing a separable convex function) over a polymatroid. Besides the joint replenishment model described above, this class of problems has many important applications in combinatorial optimization, resource allocation [9] , dynamic scheduling [22] , information theory [20] , and many other areas. These problems can be solved by greedy algorithms; see Edmonds [3] and Federgruen and Groenevelt [5] and the references therein. We mention that this class of problems is a special case of the polynomially solvable problems studied by Hochbaum and Shanthikumar [10] .
The main contributions of this paper are the following. First, we show that the optimal objective value (of the polymatroid maximization problem with a separable concave objective function) as a function of the index set is submodular. This immediately implies that the joint replenishment game is submodular. We also prove the submodularity of the optimal objective value with respect to certain parameters of the objective function. This can be used to prove the submodularity of the one-warehouse multiple retailer game studied in [23] , which is a generalization of the joint replenishment game.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our result regarding maximizing a separable concave function over a polymatroid. This result is applied, in Section 3, to derive the submodularity of the joint replenishment game and the one-warehouse multiple retailer game. We conclude the paper in Section 4.
A Structural Result on Polymatroid Optimization
In this section, we consider the problem of maximizing a separable concave function over a polymatroid. We study the submodularity of the optimal objective value with respect to the parameters of the objective function and the index set. In order to present our key results, we first formally introduce the necessary concepts and notations below.
Given a finite set E, let 2 E = {A : A ⊆ E} be its power set. A function z : 2 E → R is said to
A function z : 2 E → R is said to be supermodular if −z is submodular.
A function z : 2 E → R is called a rank function, if it satisfies the following conditions:
• z is submodular.
For a given finite set E, and a function z : 2 E → R, the polyhedron
is called a polymatroid, if z is a rank function. Throughout this paper, we denote P (z, E) the polymatroid defined by the finite E and the rank function z.
A set X ⊆ R n is a sublattice if for any x, y ∈ X , we have x ∨ y ∈ X and x ∧ y ∈ X , where x ∨ y and x ∧ y denote, respectively, the coordinatewise maximum and minimum of x, y, i.e.,
sublattice, then a function f : X → R is said to be submodular, if for all x, y ∈ X ,
A function f : X → R is said to be supermodular, if −f is submodular. Several supermodular/submodular functions that we shall refer to in this paper are listed below.
Here and throughout the paper, we denote x + = x ∨ 0 for any x ∈ R n . Example 3. If function f : R n → R is submodular, and function g i : R → R is monotonic for each
Optimizing a Linear Function
In this subsection, we start with a special case, i.e., maximizing a linear function over a polymatroid.
More specifically, for any vector a ∈ R |E| and subset
We also consider a closely related problem
It is clear that problems (3) and (2) share the same optimal objective value. Furthermore, any optimal solution to problem (3) can be extended to an optimal solution to problem (2) . In particular, let x * A be an optimal solution to (3), and define x * E as follows:
The following is a well-known result [3] concerning an optimal solution of linear program (3).
We shall refer to this result in several places of this paper.
Then xπ is an optimal solution to (3) . Furthermore, if for any i, j ∈ A with i = j, a i = a j , then xπ is the unique optimal solution to (3) .
We next study the property of the optimal objective value of linear program (2). We first
show that the optimal objective value as a function of the set A, is submodular. To the best of our knowledge, this result was first formally stated and proved in Schulz and Uhan [19] , where it is used to show that certain scheduling games are supermodular. A slightly weaker version (regarding matroid optimization) of this result had appeared in Nemhauser et al. [14] . We provide an alternative and simple proof here.
Theorem 1. For fixed a ∈ R |E| , let h(A) denote the optimal objective value of problem (2). Then
By Lemma 1, we know that x π = (x π i : i ∈ E) with
is an optimal solution to problem (2) . By definition,
Therefore, the optimal objective value of (2) is
where we define a π n +1 = 0. It follows immediately that h(A) is submodular, because for each i,
is submodular in A, and non-negative linear combination of submodular functions is also submodular.
When a / ∈ R |E| + , notice that the optimal objective value h(A) is equal to the optimal objective value of the following problem
which is submodular in A. This completes the proof. 
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that ω ≥ 0. Define another set function z : 2 E → R, such that for any S ⊆ E,
It is known from [3] that z is a rank function, i.e., P (z , E) is a polymatroid, and that furthermore,
Defineẑ(S) = min S ⊇S z(S ). Let y be a feasible solution to problem (6) . Notice that for any
Thus, i∈S y i ≤ẑ(S).
On the other hand, if i∈S y i ≤ẑ(S), then i∈S y i ≤ z(S). Thus, problem (6) is equivalent to
Now we show thatẑ is a rank function. It is clear thatẑ is normalized and non-decreasing. We need only to show thatẑ is submodular.
Notice that z is submodular. For any sets S 1 and S 2 , there exist S 1 ⊇ S 1 and S 2 ⊇ S 2 such thatẑ(S 1 ) = z(S 1 ) andẑ(S 2 ) = z(S 2 ). Therefore, we have that
where the first inequality follows from the fact that z is submodular, and the second inequality follows from the fact that
This completes the proof.
Let g be the optimal objective value of (3) with A = E and n = |E|. In particular,
Clearly, g is a convex function of a. There are actually two different ways to interpret the function g. First, g is a natural extension of the set function z: for any S ⊆ E and denoting 1 S to be the indicator vector of S, we always have g(1 S ) = z(S). Second, for any a ∈ R n + there is a unique decomposition
Lovász [11] showed that the definitions (7) and (8) are equivalent if and only if z is submodular.
For any a ∈ R n + , an explicit way to write g is to introduce a permutation of set E, denoted by π(a), so that
Furthermore, we define the index sets
Our main result of this section is to show the submodularity of the optimal objective value of problem (2) with respect to the objective parameter vector.
Theorem 2. Consider problem (2) with A = E and let g(a) be defined as in (7). Then, (i) g is homogeneous, i.e. g(λa)
for all a, b ∈ R n . These results hold even if there are lower and upper bounds on the decision variables as in problem (5) .
Proof. The properties (i) and (ii) are rather straightforward; they follow directly from the definition of g in (7). Let us now focus on (iii).
We first show that it is sufficient to prove the submodularity of g in R 
where the inequality follows from the submoduarity of g in R
|E|
+ .
Therefore, in the rest of the proof, we prove (10) for a, b ∈ R n + . It suffices to show: for any a, u, v ∈ R n + , and u T v = 0, it holds that
Notice that u T v = 0 means that supp To that end, we define, for any i ∈ E,
By (9), it is clear that s(a) ∈ ∂g(a), i.e., s(a) is a subgradient for the convex function g at a.
Clearly, as long as π(a) remains unchanged, s(a) is a constant vector. Therefore,
(see e.g. Corollary 24.2.1 of Rockafellar [17] ). It follows that, in order to prove (11), it will be sufficient to show
for almost all t ∈ [0, 1] (except for at most O(n 2 ) points).
Now, consider a general t value such that π(a + tv) and π(a + u + tv) are uniquely determined for the parts supp (a) ∪ supp (v) and supp (a) ∪ supp (u) ∪ supp (v) respectively, and consider a given
. This is to say, if
then k ≤ k , and
Consequently,
where the inequality is due to the submodularity of z. Thus, (12) Proof. Since the sum of submodular functions is still submodular, we can safely assume that β i = The application of Theorem 2 to the joint replenishment game will be described in Section 3.
Here we provide two simple examples where Theorem 2 can be applied.
Example 3. Let c ∈ R n and p be an integer such that 1 ≤ p ≤ n. Denote the sum of the p largest coordinates of c by p(c). It is shown in [21] (Proposition 4) that p(c) as a function of c is
submodular in R n . This can be seen by applying Theorem 2 directly. Notice that
It is clear that the linear program above can be cast in the form of problem (2), using the rank function of the so-called uniform matroid of rank p. Thus it follows from Theorem 2 that p(c) is submodular.
It is shown in [16] (Theorem 4.1) that f (c) is a submodular function. This can be seen by noticing that
where λ n+1 = 0 and k(c) is the sum of the k largest coordinates of c. By the result of Example 3, we know that f (c) is submodular.
Maximizing a Separable Concave Function
In this subsection, we generalize the results in the previous subsection to the case where the objective function is separable concave. Theorems 3 and 4 generalize Theorems 1 and 2, respectively. The key idea underlying the proofs is to linearize the objective function.
Theorem 3. Fix a finite set E and a polymatroid P (z, E). For each i ∈ E, let f i : R → R be a concave function. For any A ⊆ E, define
h(A) = max i∈A f i (x i ) s.t. x ∈ P (z, E).
(15)
Then h : 2 E → R is submodular.
Proof. For any A ⊆ E, denote x(A) ∈ R

|E|
+ as an optimal solution of problem (15) . Also, for ease of presentation, we rewrite h(A) as h(A, f, P (z, E)) to highlight its dependence on the polymatroid
P (z, E) and the objective function f = (f i : i ∈ E).
Consider any A, B ⊆ E. For each i ∈ E, there exists a linear function, denoted byf
i , such thatf i (x(A ∪ B) i ) = f i (x(A ∪ B) i ) andf i (x(A ∩ B) i ) = f i (x(A ∩ B) i ).
And the concavity of f i implies that
f i (x i ) ≥f i (x i ) for min(x(A∪B) i , x(A∩B) i ) ≤ x i ≤ max(x(A∪ B) i , x(A ∩ B) i ). We define Ω A,B = {x ∈ R |E| + : x(A ∪ B) ∧ x(A ∩ B) ≤ x ≤ x(A ∪ B) ∨ x(A ∩ B)}.
Thus, for any
x ∈ Ω A,B , f i (x i ) ≥f i (x i ) for all i ∈ E.
Then we have h(A) + h(B) = h(A, f, P (z, E)) + h(B, f, P (z, E))
where the last inequality follows from Corollary 1. Notice that, x(A∪B), x(A∩B) ∈ P (z, E)∩Ω A,B .
Thus, by the definition off , we have
This completes the proof. 
Theorem 4. Fix a finite set E and a polymatroid P (z, E). For any
and
By supermodularity of ψ(y, b), we know that Since ψ(y, b) is concave in y, we have
Similarly, there exists µ i ≥ 0, i = 1, 2 such that µ 1 + µ 2 = 1 and
It then follows that
On the other hand, one can verify that
Therefore, by the fact that L( 
, and the inequality holds as an equality when (a i , x i ) is an extreme
These constructions and definitions, together with Theorem 2, lead to
≤ max
Equality (18) 
Inequality (21) follows from Corollary 2. Inequality (23) holds since
To conclude this section, we show the Theorems 4 is stronger than Theorem 3. To see this,
we consider problem (15).
For each i ∈ E, we define a functionf i as follows. Recall that f i is concave. If f i is nondecreasing, then letf i = f i . Otherwise, there must exist
It is clear thatf i is non-decreasing and concave. Furthermore, problem (15) is equivalent to
It is straightforward to verify thatf i is supermodular in (x i , a i ) and concave in both x i and a i ≥ 0. Therefore, by Theorem 4, if
Then g(a A ) = h(A), and for any
Therefore,
which implies that h : 2 E → R is submodular. Theorem 3 follows. Similarly, we can show Theorem
One-Warehouse Multiple Retailer Game
In this section, we consider the one-warehouse multiple retailer game studied by Zhang [23] ; it is a generalization of the joint replenishment game studied by Anily and Haviv [1] and Zhang [24] .
The presentation of the model follows close to that in [23] . In this model, we are given a set of n retailers, denoted by N = {1, 2, · · · , n}. The demand that retailer i faces is continuous and deterministic at a fixed rate d i > 0. The retailers place orders to a single warehouse to satisfy customer demands. These orders generate demands at the warehouse, which holds inventory and is replenished from an external supplier. Backlogging is not allowed in this model. The lead time is assumed to be zero, i.e., orders arrive instantaneously.
For ease of presentation, the warehouse is denoted by 0. Also, any i ∈ N ∪ {0} is called a facility, i.e., a facility can be a warehouse or a retailer.
For each i ∈ N ∪ {0}, there is a per unit holding cost rate h i . For simplicity we denote,
We also assume that 0 < h 0 < h i and thus 0 < H w i < H i , for any i ∈ N . This assumption is common in the literature; see, e.g., Roundy [18] , and Federgruen et al. [7] . When a subset S ⊆ N ∪ {0} of facilities places an order together, a joint setup cost is incurred, which is denoted by K(S). We assume that K(S) is a rank function.
We restrict ourselves to the so-called power-of-two inventory policies, which can be character- The effectiveness of power-of-two policies has been discussed in Federgruen et al. [7] . If the base planning period L is chosen arbitrarily, then the optimal power-of-two policy yields an average cost that is at most 6% higher than the optimal cost, and thus is 94% effective. By choosing the best L, the optimal power-of-two policy is 98% effective.
Now we consider a cooperative game associated with this inventory model. We denote this
Here N is the grand coalition of n retailers and V Γ L is the characteristic cost function defined for every coalition S ⊆ N . In particular, V Γ L (∅) = 0 and for
is the long-run average cost, under an optimal power-of-two policy, of the system that consists of the warehouse and the retailers in S. The game (N, V Γ ) is called a concave game if the set function
Federgruen et al. [7] have shown that
where
Submodularity of the Joint Replenishment Game
Now we consider a special case of the one-warehouse multiple retailer game when there is no
warehouse. This reduces to the joint replenishment game studied in Zhang [24] . We denote the
(This can be obtained by setting k 0 = 0 and H w i = 0 in (26).) It is known that we can change the order of the optimization of (27) from min-max to max-min without changing the optimal objective value [23] . That is,
In [24] , an analytical solution to problem (28) was derived, which is in turn used to propose a population monotonic allocation scheme for the joint replenishment game. As most of the cooperative games that admit a population monotonic allocation scheme are submodular, Zhang [24] conjecture that the joint replenishment game is submodular. Here we show that this is indeed the case.
Proof. For each fixed T i , the function
is submodular. This completes the proof.
Anily and Haviv [1] proved that Theorem 5 holds for a special case of the joint replenishment game where the joint setup cost function has the first order interaction structure. Theorem 5 generalizes their main result.
Submodularity of the One-Warehouse Multiple Retailer Game
Now we consider the submodularity of the one-warehouse multiple retailer game (N, V Γ L ), where the function V Γ L (S) is defined by (26). It is tempting to prove the submodularity of V Γ L (S) by following the approach used in the proof of Theorem 5. The dual problem of (26) can be formulated as follows [23] :
It is known that this pair of primal-dual problems (26) and (29) do not have duality gap. However, the objective function of (29) is not separable. Therefore, the results developed in Section 2 are not directly applicable to problem (29). In order to prove the submodularity of V Γ L (S), we focus on the primal formulation (26) and apply Theorem 2 to the inner maximization problem of (26).
Theorem 6. The one-warehouse multiple retailer game
Proof. For any S ⊆ N , let T * S be an optimal solution to the outer minimization problem of (26).
= min
In particular, if we define T * S,N such that (T * S,N ) i = (T * S ) i for i ∈ S and (T * S,N ) i = +∞ otherwise, then T * S,N is an optimal solution to the outer minimization problem of (31).
Notice that the feasible set of the outer minimization problem of (31),Γ 
where (T N ) S is the projection of T N to the subset S. Then we have
≤ G A∪B (T This, together with (32), implies that
which shows that V Γ L (S) is submodular.
We remark that Theorem 6 can be generalized to the case where there are upper and lower bounds on the replenishment intervals of the retailers and the warehouse. The reason is that, with this additional constraint, the feasible set for the replenishment intervals is still a sublattice, and so the proof of Theorem 6 will still go through.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have obtained some structural results regarding polymatroid optimization. We identify conditions so that the optimal objective function is a submodular function in the index set and the objective parameters. In the most general version, for each a ∈ R |E| , we consider the following problem, max x∈P (z,E) i∈E
where P (z, E) is a polymatroid, and for each i ∈ E, f i : R 2 → R is submodular in (x i , a i ), and concave in both x i and a i . We prove that the optimal objective value as a function of parameter a is submodular. This result and its variants have been applied to analyze the joint replenishment game and the one-warehouse multiple retailer game.
The submodularity results regarding polymatroid optimization may find other applications as well, given the wide range of applications of polymatroid optimization. One possible area is for problems of scheduling multiclass queueing systems that satisfy strong conservation laws; see for example Garbe and Glazebrook [8] , where the objective function of the optimization problem is linear, but the feasible set is slightly more general than a polymatroid.
